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Abstract
This paper shows that supervision with soft information is valuable whenever super-
visors and supervisees collude under asymmetric information and proceeds then to derive
an Equivalence Principle between organizational forms of supervisory and productive ac-
tivities. We consider an organization with an agent privately informed on his productivity
and a risk averse supervisor getting signals on the agent’s type. In a centralized orga-
nization, the principal can communicate and contract with both the supervisor and the
agent. However, these two agents can collude against the principal. In a decentralized
organization, the principal only communicates and contracts with the supervisor who in
turn sub-contracts with the agent. We show that the two organizations achieve the same
outcome. We discuss this equivalence and provide various comparative statics results to
assess the efficiency of supervisory structures.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the optimal design of an organization involving both supervisory and
productive tasks when these two tasks are performed by different agents. Agents privately
know different pieces of information that the principal of the organization tries to elicit to
achieve the best possible resource allocation. The productive agent is privately informed
of his marginal cost of production. The supervisor observes a soft information signal
correlated with this cost. The principal does not observe either piece of information.
We analyze the role of supervisory information when the supervisor and the agent can
communicate with each other and collude against the principal. Without communication
between the productive agent and the supervisor, the Revelation Principle implies that the
principal can achieve the best possible outcome by directly contracting and communicating
with both agents who adopt a non-cooperative behavior. A centralized organization
dominates, at least weakly, any other organizational structure. Whether organizational
design matters and how useful supervision remains when collusion between the supervisor
and the agent takes place are still two unanswered questions.
To address these issues, we consider two settings. In the centralized organization,
the principal contracts and communicates simultaneously with the supervisor and the
agent. Before reporting to the principal, these two parties can collude. The supervisor
makes a take-it-or-leave-it side-contract offer to the agent. Such a side-contract specifies
some monetary transfers and a collective manipulation of their individual reports to the
principal. Importantly, collusion takes place under asymmetric information. Although
the supervisor is better informed than the principal about the agent’s type, he does not
know the latter’s cost parameter. In a decentralized structure, the principal contracts only
with the supervisor and delegates to him the right to contract in turn with the agent.
The information structure is the same as in the centralized organization but the principal
has no direct communication with the productive agent.
Our two central results are the following: first, whenever there is some residual asym-
metric information between the supervisor and the agent, supervision is valuable for the
organization. Second, we derive an Equivalence Principle between organizational forms.
The decentralized organization is one possible implementation of the optimal collusion-
proof centralized mechanism. Delegating to the supervisor the design of the agent’s in-
centive scheme achieves the best possible outcome because of the threat of collusion in
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the centralized mechanism.
To understand these results, we first need to discuss how the optimal grand-mechanism
in the centralized structure is affected by the possibility of collusion between the super-
visor and the agent. Collusion aims at implementing a collective manipulation of the
supervisor and the agent’s individual reports into the grand-mechanism. Asymmetric
information within the coalition creates a trade-off between the ex post efficiency of the
collective manipulation and the supervisor’s desire of extracting the agent’s information
rent if the supervisor is only imperfectly informed on the latter. Because of this trade-off,
the collective manipulation may be ex post inefficient in some states of nature. The prin-
cipal benefits from these ex post inefficiencies since they facilitate collusion deterrence. As
the agent’s status quo utility level obtained from playing the grand-mechanism without
colluding increases, the trade-off between ex post efficiency of the collective manipulation
and extraction of the agent’s rent within the coalition is tilted towards efficiency. The
intuition is the same as in a simple principal-agent problem with type-dependent reser-
vation utilities1. If the profile of the agent’s status quo reservation utilities is sufficiently
increasing, the incentive constraints at the side-contracting stage are not binding and the
manipulation of reports is no longer distorted to limit the agent’s information rents in
the coalition. The principal is thus hurt by raising the agent’s status quo utility above
the minimal amount consistent with the latter’s incentive and participation constraints.
This instrument, only available if the principal contracts directly with the agent, is thus
useless under collusion and the principal can as well delegate to the supervisor the right
to design the agent’s scheme.
As a by-product, this Equivalence Principle between organizational forms yields a
number of interesting comparative statics results about the efficiency of supervision with
soft information.
Supervisor’s Risk Aversion: Keeping in mind that the decentralized structure im-
plements the optimal collusion-proof contract, the principal would like to induce the
supervisor to choose the same sub-contract as what he would offer himself if he knew
the supervisor’s signal. This problem has clearly a moral hazard flavor, provided that
we reinterpret the moral hazard action as the non-verifiable sub-contract of the agent
chosen by the supervisor. The moral hazard literature2 tells us that providing incen-
1See Jullien (2000) among others.
2See Mirrlees (1999) and Holmstrom (1979) among others. See also the literature on adverse selection
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tives is costless with risk neutrality. With a risk neutral supervisor, everything happens
as if the principal directly receives the supervisory information. Otherwise, there is a
trade-off between providing insurance to the supervisor and incentivizing him to offer the
sub-contract preferred by the principal.
Information Structure: The principal’s payoff is shown to be non-monotonic in the
accuracy of the supervisor’s information. When the supervisor knows exactly the agent’s
cost, he can offer him a wage just equal to this cost and extract all his rent. The collective
manipulation of the coalition is necessarily ex post efficient. The three-tier hierarchy
reduces to a standard two-tier hierarchy where the supervisor and the agent are de facto
merged. Supervisory information becomes useless. On the other hand, a non-informative
signal is also useless. The optimal accuracy of supervisory information is thus interior.
Bargaining Power in Collusion: As the agent’s bargaining power in side-contracting
increases, the collective manipulation of reports moves towards ex post efficiency since
the agent’s information rent matters less at the side-contracting stage. To improve his
payoff, the principal wants thus to increase inefficiency within the coalition and can do
so by undoing through the grand-mechanism he offers any bargaining power left to the
agent at the side-contracting stage.
This paper is linked to the recent literature on collusion under asymmetric information
developed in Laffont and Martimort (1997, 2000). The present focus on supervision
and organizational design is new, but we use a similar methodology. In those latter
papers, colluding agents are both productive, risk neutral and asymmetrically informed
on each other and the collusion is organized by a benevolent uninformed third-party.3
Here instead, the asymmetry between the preferences and information of the colluding
partners suggests a less symmetric treatment within the coalition. The collusive offer is
made by the less informed supervisor who is risk averse.4
Our model of decentralized contracting fills also a gap between two strands of the liter-
ature on hierarchies which have evolved independently over the recent years. On the one
and risk aversion in two-tier hierarchies (Salanie´ (1990) and Laffont and Rochet (1999) for such models).
3Laffont and Martimort (1997) analyze a setting with symmetric agents having independently dis-
tributed types. The binding coalition incentive compatibility constraints write as with collusion under
symmetric information. Laffont and Martimort (2000) deal instead with the case of a strictly positive
correlation between the agents’ types. Asymmetric information within the coalition can help the principal
because it increases the set of implementable output schedules when the correlation is large enough.
4See also Itoh (1993) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) for models of collusion with risk averse
agents in pure moral hazard contexts.
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hand, Cre´mer and Riordan (1987), Baron and Besanko (1992), Melumad, Mookherjee and
Reichelstein (1992, 1995), Mookherjee and Reichelstein (2001) and Laffont and Martimort
(1998) have developed models where decentralized contracting does not entail any welfare
loss with respect to the case of centralized contracting when risk neutral agents produce
and do not collude. McAfee and McMillan (1995) and Laffont and Martimort (1998) have
instead shown that agency costs of delegation may appear when intermediate risk neutral
agents are protected by limited liability. Our model differs from those latter works as the
intermediate layer of our hierarchy does not produce but only supervises. Introducing
risk aversion for the intermediate layer allows us to trace out how agency costs evolve
between the two polar cases analyzed by the previous literature. More importantly, our
result stresses that the relevant benchmark to assess whether decentralization involves
any welfare loss for the principal is not centralized contracting with the agents adopting
a non-cooperative behavior but centralized contracting with collusion. 5
The collusion literature following Tirole (1986)6 has preferred to view three-tier hier-
archies as nexi of both formal grand-mechanisms offered by a principal to all members
of the organization and informal collusive side-contracts linking together agents eager to
promote their own goals instead of those of the organization. Following this paradigm,
the informal side-contract between a risk neutral supervisor and his supervisee is illegal,
purely implicit, being enforced by trust, reciprocity, or through repeated relationships.7
A first weakness of this approach is that frictions in side-contracting are most often cap-
tured by stipulating exogenous transaction costs of side-contracting.8 Retaining the more
tractable assumption of enforceability but, as we do below, introducing asymmetric in-
formation creates endogenously some frictions in side-contracting. It shows also how the
principal can play on these frictions to undermine the efficiency of collusive behavior. A
second weakness of this collusion paradigm is that it takes the organizational structure as
5In the case of two risk neutral and symmetric productive agents, Laffont and Martimort (2000)
show that collusion involves no profit loss for the principal with respect to the case of a non-cooperative
behavior between the agents when the collusion-proof grand-mechanism is implemented in Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium and the agents’ types are independently distributed. Putting together this result with
the fact that decentralized contracting involves no loss with respect to centralized contracting and a
non-cooperative behavior implies that the decentralized structure entails no profit loss for the principal.
6See also Tirole (1992), Kofman and Lawarre´e (1993) and Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 11)
among others.
7Tirole (1992) and Martimort (1999) present some modeling of these self-enforcing collusive behaviors.
8See nevertheless Laffont and Meleu (1997) for the role of reciprocity on the transaction costs of
side-contracting and Martimort (1999) for a derivation of those transaction costs in a repeated game
framework.
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given.9 This literature remains silent on whether a decentralized organization could help
the principal to reduce collusion. Our Equivalence Principle shows instead that there is
no gain for the principal from controlling himself the productive tasks. A decentralized
organization can thus be viewed as a particular implementation of the optimal response
to the threat of collusion. Notice that we also show in the sequel that the decentralized
structure implements the best possible outcome as a unique equilibrium. This may be
proposed as an argument in favor of a strict preference for decentralization.
Baliga and Sjostrom (1998) address delegation issues in a moral hazard environment
where risk neutral agents, protected by limited liability, can collude. As in our model,
information sets are nested along the hierarchy: only one agent can observe the productive
effort of the other. They show that decentralization can implement the optimal collusion-
proof contract and derive an “Equivalence Principle” similar to ours. Macho-Stadler and
Perez-Castrillo (1998) investigate the same question with risk averse agents but also allow
for commitment difficulties on the principal’s side. They show that the latters push in
favor of more decentralization.
A recent paper by Celik (2001) re-examines the validity of the Equivalence Principle
in a model with a different information structure than ours: the supervisor observes a
partition of the set of agent’s types. Within his framework, he shows that centralized
mechanisms can do strictly better than decentralized mechanisms.10 The issue of whether
the Equivalence Principle extends beyond the binary framework, but keeping our other
modelling assumptions fixed, is an open question.
Section 2 presents the model and discusses the two organizational forms considered
in this paper. Section 3 analyzes several benchmarks and, in particular, the case where
the supervisor and the agent do not collude against the principal. Section 4 describes the
set of collusion-proof grand-mechanisms under centralized contracting and derives the
optimal collusion-proof mechanism. Section 5 shows how a decentralized organization is
a particular implementation of this outcome. We prove there an Equivalence Principle.
Section 6 provides some comparative statics. All proofs are in an Appendix.
9Felli (1998) shows nevertheless that some form of delegation helps to deter collusion. In a model with
exogenous frictions in side-contracting, Baliga (1999) describes a mechanism which allows the principal
to get supervisory information even though this information is soft. This paper shares therefore with
ours the idea that transaction costs help to prevent collusion.
10Contrary to us, he does not allow for randomized mechanisms in collusion.
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2 The Model
2.1 Players and Information
We consider a three agent organization involving a principal, a supervisor and a productive
agent. Technology imposes separation between ownership, supervision and production.
The agent produces a quantity q of output at a constant marginal cost θ which is his
own private information. Types are drawn from a discrete distribution on Θ = {θ1, θ2}
(we denote ∆θ = θ2 − θ1 > 0). The supervisor is uninformed about the agent’s type.
Nonetheless, he receives a signal τ on the agent’s marginal cost. τ is drawn from a
discrete distribution on T = {τ1, τ2}. This signal is observed by both the supervisor and
the agent. Hence, informational sets are nested along the hierarchy: nature reveals to the
agent both his type and the supervisor’s information; only the latter is available to the
supervisor while the principal observes none of these pieces of information.11 The joint
probabilities on (θi, τj) are defined as pij = Prob(θ = θi, τ = τj) with pij > 0 for all i, j.
From the joint distribution above, one can derive the conditional probabilities p(θi|τj).
There is a positive correlation between signals and types when the monotone likelihood
ratio property is satisfied: p(θ1|τ1)
p(θ2|τ1) =
p11
p21
≥ p(θ1|τ2)
p(θ2|τ2) =
p12
p22
.12
2.2 Preferences
The agent is risk neutral13 and has a utility function U = t− θq, where t is the monetary
transfer he receives either from the principal under centralized contracting or from the
supervisor under decentralized contracting. The agent accepts to produce as long as he
gets his reservation utility exogenously normalized to zero.
The supervisor is risk averse and has a CARA utility function defined over his mon-
etary payoffs: V = v(x) = 1
r
(1− e−rx)14. Under centralized contracting, the supervisor’s
11Nested information structures are standard in both the literatures on collusion and on delegation in
hierarchies (see Tirole (1986, 1992) and McAfee and McMillan (1995) among others).
12An example of such an information structure is as follows: the agent has a low (resp. high) cost θ1
(resp. θ2) with probability ν (resp. 1 − ν) and the conditional probabilities of the signal are p(τ1|θ1) =
p(τ2|θ2) = . Then, p11 = ν, p21 = (1 − ν)(1 − ), p12 = ν(1 − ) and p22 = (1 − ν).  (≥ 12 ) can
be viewed of as the signal’s precision. For  close to 12 , the signal conveys little information about the
agent’s type while, if  = 1, the supervisor exactly observes the agent’s type.
13Our results would be the same with a risk averse agent since his ex post participation and incentive
constraints would be identical and only those constraints are relevant for the analysis.
14r = 0 corresponds to the limiting case where the supervisor is risk neutral.
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income is the wage s he receives from the principal. Under decentralized contracting, one
must subtract from s the agent’s transfer to get the supervisor’s income.
Producing q units of output yields revenue R(q) to the principal with R′(·) > 0
and R′′(·) < 0. To ensure always positive production levels, we assume that the Inada
conditions R′(0) = +∞ and R′(+∞) = 0 hold. The principal’s profit is given by Π =
R(q)−s−t under centralized contracting and Π = R(q)−s under decentralized contracting.
2.3 Organizations and Contracts
Centralized Contracting: In a centralized organization, the principal directly contracts
and communicates with both the supervisor and the agent. A grand-mechanism ruling
the organization is a triplet GC = {t(ms,ma), s(ms,ma), q(ms,ma)} stipulating monetary
transfers respectively for the agent and the supervisor and output targets as a function of
the supervisor’s and the agent’s messages (denoted respectively ms and ma) which belong
respectively to two message spaces Ms and Ma.
A centralized organization may be subject to coalition formation between the super-
visor and the agent. The supervisor has all the bargaining power at the collusion stage.15
The supervisor, knowing the realization of τ , makes a take-it-or-leave-it side-offer to the
agent. This side-contract is a pair SCτ = {φτ (·), yτ (·)} where φτ (·) is a collective manip-
ulation of the messages (ms,ma) sent to the principal and yτ (·) is a side-transfer from
the supervisor to the agent. φτ (·) maps the agent’s report to the supervisor into the set
∆(Ma ×Ms) of measures on messages sent to the principal. The Revelation Principle
applies at the side-contracting stage, and there is no loss of generality in assuming that
SCτ is a direct mechanism. As a by-product of the Collusion-Proofness Principle shown
in the Appendix, there is also no loss of generality in restricting the principal to offer
direct grand-mechanisms.
Following the earlier literature on collusion, the side-contract is fully enforceable. This
is of course a simplifying assumption which yields an upper bound on what can be achieved
by the collusion between the supervisor and the agent in a centralized organization. This
assumption also implies that the supervisor is able to commit to the collective manipula-
tion of reports and the side-transfers proposed to the agent. As in standard principal-agent
15Section 6.3 will drop this assumption and show that our results are robust as long as the supervisor
retains some bargaining power.
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models, this commitment is crucial to make credible any distortion away from ex post
efficiency in the manipulation of reports φτ (·) which is needed to solve the asymmetric
information problem within the coalition.
Decentralized Contracting: The principal contracts only with the supervisor who, in
turn, sub-contracts with the agent. With respect to the case of centralized contracting, a
grand-mechanism is now restricted in two ways. First, the agent receives no transfer from
the principal, t = 0. Second, the agent does not communicate directly with the principal
so that Ma = ∅. However, the supervisor can use a message space Ms to communicate with
the principal which may be larger than T since he may have to communicate information
on the agent’s type that he will obtain from sub-contracting. A sub-contract16 links now
the supervisor and the agent. This sub-contract writes as SCτ = {φτ (·), yτ (·)}. yτ (·) is the
agent’s transfer received from the supervisor, φτ (·) is the manipulation of the supervisor’s
report to the principal. The Revelation Principle applies at the sub-contracting stage and
there is no loss of generality in restricting the analysis to sub-contracts which are direct
truthful mechanisms.17
2.4 Timings and Comparison of the Different Contracting Games
The timings of the contractual games under both organizational forms are as follows.
• The agent learns θ and τ . The supervisor learns only τ .
• The principal offers a grand-mechanism to the supervisor and the agent (resp. to
the supervisor only) under centralized (resp. decentralized) contracting.18
• The supervisor and the agent both accept or refuse the grand-mechanism under
centralized contracting. If any of them refuses, the game ends. Under decentralized
contracting, only the supervisor is asked to accept the grand-mechanism. Again, if
he refuses, the game ends.
16The terminology sub-contract is used to distinguish this formal contract from the secret side-contract
of the centralized organization.
17Finally, note that the agent refuses de facto the decentralized grand-mechanism if he refuses the
sub-contract.
18Suppose that the principal offers the contract before the agents learn their information. If the agent
is infinitely risk averse below zero wealth, his ex post participation constraints must still be satisfied. The
risk averse supervisor’s interim participation constraints would be replaced by an ex ante participation
constraint. Similar output distortions to those we obtain below would appear.
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• Under centralized (resp. decentralized) contracting, the supervisor offers a collusive
side-contract (resp. a sub-contract) to the agent. The agent accepts or refuses
this contract. If he refuses, the grand-mechanism is played non-cooperatively by
the supervisor and the agent under centralized contracting and no production takes
place under decentralized contracting.
• Production and transfers in all mechanisms take place.
With both organizations, the acceptance of the grand-mechanism by the supervisor
takes place before learning the agent’s type during side-contracting. Hence, the supervi-
sor’s interim participation constraints must be satisfied by the grand-mechanism. Instead,
since the agent is informed on his own type and on the supervisor’s signal at the time of
accepting the side-contract, the agent’s ex post participation constraints must be satisfied.
The key aspect in which centralized contracting differs from decentralized contracting
is that only in the former the principal directly communicates and contracts with the
agent. The principal can thus affect the status quo payoffs obtained by the different
types of agent when they refuse the collusive side-contract offered by the supervisor.
Since the agent’s possible acceptance of the side-contract is made knowing his type and
the supervisor’s signal, any side-contract which guarantees these status quo payoffs must
satisfy some ex post participation constraints which are not only type-dependent but also
dependent on the non-cooperative play of the grand-mechanism GC. Technically, only the
participation constraints differ at the side-contracting stage between both organizational
forms. The agent’s status quo payoff under decentralized contracting is always zero.
The assumption of perfect enforceability of the side-contract makes the comparison
between organizational forms more meaningful as, in the latter form, sub-contracts are
legally enforceable. It also allows to isolate the impact of asymmetric information on the
efficiency of side-contracting.
3 Benchmarks
• Direct Supervision: Let us first consider the case where the principal directly receives
the signal τ on the agent’s private information. Using the Revelation Principle, there is
no loss of generality in looking for the optimal contract within the class of direct truthful
9
revelation mechanisms of the form {tτ (θˆ); qτ (θˆ)} where θˆ is the agent’s report on his
efficiency parameter to the principal. For ease of notations, we denote thereafter by
tij = tτj(θi) and qij = qτj(θi) the agent’s transfer and output when he reports θi and the
principal knows τj. We define also by uij = tij−θiqij the agent’s information rent in state
(θi, τj). As it is standard in two-type adverse selection models, the following constraints
are of particular importance:19
• Incentive compatibility constraints for an efficient agent:
u1j ≥ u2j + ∆θq2j, for j = 1, 2, (1)
• Participation constraints for an inefficient agent:
u2j ≥ 0, for j = 1, 2. (2)
When he has observed a signal τj, the principal updates his beliefs on the agent’s type.
Conditional probabilities become p(θ1|τj) = p1jp1j+p2j for j = 1, 2. Accordingly, the optimal
contract solves:
max
{q1j ,q2j ,u1j ,u2j}
p(θ1|τj)(R(q1j)− θ1q1j − u1j) + p(θ2|τj)(R(q2j)− θ2q2j − u2j)
subject to (1) and (2).
Solving this problem yields the conditionally optimal second-best grand-mechanism GCsb.
This mechanism implements the first best outputs qsb1j = q
fb
1 for an efficient agent and
outputs qsb2j for an inefficient one where:
R′(qfb1 ) = θ1 (3)
R′(qsb2j) = θ2 +
p1j
p2j
∆θ. (4)
To reduce the cost of the efficient agent’s incentive compatibility constraint (1) and to
make less valuable for an efficient agent to mimic an inefficient one, the principal reduces
the output produced by an inefficient agent. A positive rent is left to the efficient agent
(usb1j = t
sb
1j − θ1qsb1j = ∆θqsb2j) while the participation constraint (2) of an inefficient agent is
binding (usb2j = t
sb
2j − θ2qsb2j = 0 for all j). The monotone likelihood ratio property implies
19When the following constraints are binding, as it will be the case at the optimum of the principal’s
problem, it is easy to show that the remaining constraints are strictly satisfied.
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that the inefficient agent’s output is more distorted after the observation of τ1 than after
the observation of τ2:
qsb21 < q
sb
22. (5)
Indeed, the agent is more likely to be efficient when τ1 is observed than when τ2 is
observed. Reducing the efficient agent’s information rent calls then for a greater allocative
inefficiency of the inefficient agent’s output.
•Uninformative Supervision: Let us now consider the polar case where the supervisor
never gets any signal on the agent. Again, output distortions only concern the inefficient
agent. It is immediate to show that the optimal quantity for an inefficient agent is the
unconditional second-best qp2 defined as:
R′(qp2) = θ2 +
p11 + p12
p21 + p22
∆θ. (6)
Only the efficient agent gets a strictly positive rent (up1j = ∆θq
p
2, u
p
1j = 0).
• Non-Cooperative Implementation and Centralized Contracting: Applying the
Revelation Principle, there is no loss of generality in restricting the principal to use direct
truthful revelation mechanisms when the supervisor and the agent do not collude. Let us
denote by sijk (resp. tijk and qijk) the supervisor’s wage (resp. the agent’s transfer and
the output target) when the agent reports that he has type θi and that the supervisor’s
signal is τk and when the supervisor reports he has observed τj. To simplify notations,
we also write sijj = sij (resp. tijj = tij).
Because τ is a piece of information which is commonly known by the supervisor and the
agent, the logic of Nash implementation applies.20 The principal can costlessly elicit this
signal by building a revelation scheme such that the agent and the supervisor truthfully
report τ to the principal. The agent’s incentive constraints can be reduced to the following
relevant incentive constraints:
uij ≥ ti′j − θiqi′j for all (i, i′, j). (7)
The optimal contracting outcome with a non-cooperative behavior is thus the condition-
ally optimal outcome. The risk averse supervisor is perfectly insured and gets zero wage
ssbij = 0 for all (i, j) in this contract. If the principal can perfectly control and forbid com-
munication between the agent and the supervisor, he can thus achieve the same outcome
20See Maskin (1999).
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as with direct supervision. Importantly, this result is independent of the supervisor’s
degree of risk aversion when the agents do not collude.
• Unique Implementation: A clever design of the out-of-equilibrium wages offered to
the supervisor ensures also unique Nash implementation. The supervisor can be used to
break any unwanted equilibrium. Suppose indeed that the principal offers wage ssbijk for
j 6= k such that:
p(θ1|τ1)v(ssb112) + p(θ2|τ1)v(ssb212) > 0 > p(θ1|τ2)v(ssb112) + p(θ2|τ2)v(ssb212) (8)
and
p(θ1|τ2)v(ssb121) + p(θ2|τ2)v(ssb221) > 0 > p(θ1|τ1)v(ssb121) + p(θ2|τ1)v(ssb221). (9)
The first left-hand side inequality in (8) says that the supervisor prefers to report the true
state of nature τ1 when the agent reports instead τ2. This makes impossible to sustain a
non-truthful equilibrium when τ1 realizes. On the other hand, the second right-hand side
inequality in (8) ensures that the supervisor does not want to lie when τ2 realizes and the
agent reports this state of nature truthfully to the principal. It is easy to check that the
monotone likelihood ratio property p11
p21
> p12
p22
ensures that the indifference curves of the
supervisor in different states of nature only cross once and that such punishments and
rewards exist.21 In a similar vein, (9) ensures that a non-truthful equilibrium does not
exist when τ2 realizes and that the supervisor’s prefers to tell the truth when τ1 realizes.
22
• Non-Robustness to Collusion: The second-best mechanism GCsb is not robust to
collusion. Consider the following side-contract SCsb:
• {φsbτj(θi) = (θi, τj); ysbij = 0} for all (i, j) 6= (1, 1).
• {φsbτ1(θ1) = (θ1, τ2); ysb11 = −∆θ(qsb22 − qsb21)} for (i, j) = (1, 1).
The composition of the side- and the grand-mechanism is incentive compatible. The
efficient agent is just indifferent between telling the truth or lying to the supervisor since
the following incentive constraints hold:
tsb12 − θ1qsb12 + ysb11 = ∆θqsb22 −∆θ(qsb22 − qsb21) = ∆θqsb21
21In other words, the decision rule is uniquely Nash implementable.
22Since the agent’s utility function does not depend on τ directly, the agent cannot be used to break
unwanted equilibria. Moreover, we impose tijk = −qijk = −∞ for j 6= k for the agent’s punishments so
that there cannot be any non-truthful equilibrium where the agent deviates both on his reports of type
and signal.
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≥ (=)tsb21 − θ1qsb21 when τ1 realizes and,
tsb12 − θ1qsb12 = ∆θqsb22 ≥ (=)tsb22 − θ1qsb22 when τ2 realizes.
Similarly, the inefficient agent strictly prefers to tell the truth to the supervisor since:
tsb21 − θ2qsb21 = 0 > tsb12 − θ2qsb12 + ysb11 = ∆θ(qsb21 − qfb1 ) when τ1 realizes and,
tsb22 − θ2qsb22 > tsb12 − θ2qsb12 when τ2 realizes.
The composition of the side- and the grand-mechanism is also individually rational for
the agent who prefers this composition to the non-cooperative play of GCsb. This is of
course the case for the inefficient agent who gets zero whether he colludes or not. Instead,
if he refuses the side-contract and the truthful Nash equilibrium of the grand-mechanism
GCsb is played, the efficient agent gets
tsb12 − θ1qsb12 + ysb11 = ∆θqsb21 ≥ (=)tsb11 − θ1qsb11 = ∆θqsb21
when τ1 realizes and his utility in state τ2 is unchanged (namely ∆θq
sb
22). Finally, the
supervisor benefits strictly from the manipulation of reports and gets a strictly positive
expected payoff when τ1 has been observed while he gets zero without collusion:
p(θ1|τ1)v(∆θ(qsb22 − qsb21)) + p(θ2|τ1)v(0) > 0.
In the next section, we look for the optimal centralized mechanism immune to this kind
of collusion.
4 Centralized Contracting
We start by deriving the optimal side-contract for any given grand-mechanism GC. Then,
we obtain a Collusion-Proofness Principle which allows us to restrict the analysis to grand-
mechanisms which are robust to side-contracting. Collusion-proof mechanisms define
status quo payoffs such that the null side-contract is optimal given these reservation
payoffs. Then, we characterize those collusion-proof grand-mechanisms with a set of
simple coalition incentive constraints. Finally, we optimize within this set to find the
principal’s optimal grand-mechanism.
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4.1 Collusion-Proof Grand-Mechanisms
Let us denote by Uij the agent’s status quo payoff when his type is θi, and when the
supervisor has observed signal τj, and they play non-cooperatively the truthful equilibrium
of an individually incentive compatible grand-mechanism GC. If any of the agents refuses
the null side-contract and the partners end up behaving non-cooperatively, they would
still be punished by this grand-mechanism when their reports on τ to the principal differ.
As we discuss below, punishments can still be designed to ensure unique implementation
if the agents fail to cooperate provided that the supervisor does not change his beliefs on
the agent following the latter’s refusal of collusion. In what follows, we will thus assume
that side-contracting is sustained with those passive beliefs.23
By definition, we have thus Uij = tij−θiqij. The agent’s information rent obtained from
truthfully playing the side-contract is instead: uij = yij + t(φτj(θi)) − θiq(φτj(θi)) where
φτj(θi) is the manipulation of reports induced by the collusive side-contract when the agent
reports having type θi to the supervisor and the latter has observed τj.
24 Acceptance of
the side-contract by both types of agent imposes thus the following type-dependent ex
post participation constraints:
u1j ≥ U1j for j = 1, 2, (10)
u2j ≥ U2j for j = 1, 2. (11)
4.1.1 Optimal Side-Contracts under Asymmetric Information
We focus in what follows on side-contracts such that only the efficient agent’s incentive
constraint may be binding at the optimum of the supervisor’s problem.25 The optimal
side-contract is thus solution to the following problem:
max
{φτj (·),uij}
p(θ1|τj)v(s(φτj(θ1)) + t(φτj(θ1))− θ1q(φτj(θ1))− u1j)
+p(θ2|τj)v(s(φτj(θ2)) + t(φτj(θ2))− θ2q(φτj(θ2))− u2j)
23See Laffont and Martimort (1997, 2000) for a similar use of passive beliefs and below for further
remarks on the case of other out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
24This manipulation being possibly stochastic, t(φτj (·)) (resp. q(φτj (·))) should be viewed as an ex-
pectation with respect to the distribution of reports in the grand-mechanism induced by φτj (·).
25This is a standard feature of adverse selection models as long as q(φτj (θ1)) ≥ q(φτj (θ2)) and U1j−U2j
not too large (no countervailing incentives coming from type-dependent participation constraints).
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subject to (1)-(10) and (11).
where, in the right-hand side of (1), q2j is now replaced by q(φτj(θ2)).
The supervisor reduces the side-transfer y2j given to the inefficient agent to the point
where the ex post participation constraint (11) is binding and thus u2j = U2j. Conse-
quently, the optimal manipulation function φ∗τj(·) and the efficient agent’s rents u∗1j are
solutions to a reduced problem with (1) and (10) as the only relevant constraints. Multi-
plying the objective function by p1j + p2j > 0, the supervisor’s problem (S) becomes:
(S) : max
{φτj (·),uij}
p1jv(s(φτj(θ1)) + t(φτj(θ1))− θ1q(φτj(θ1))− u1j)
+p2jv(s(φτj(θ2)) + t(φτj(θ2))− θ2q(φτj(θ2))− U2j)
subject to (1) and (10).
Let us denote by λj and µj the respective positive multipliers in the two constraints of
the associated Lagrangian.
• Optimizing with respect to u1j yields the following relationship between the supervisor’s
marginal utility of income and the multipliers of (1) and (10):
p1jv
′(s(φ∗τj(θ1)) + t(φ
∗
τj
(θ1))− θ1q(φ∗τj(θ1))− u∗1j) = λj + µj. (12)
• Optimizing with respect to φ∗τj(θ1) and φ∗τj(θ2), we obtain respectively:
φ∗τj(θ1) ∈ argmaxφ˜∈∆(Ma×Ms)s(φ˜) + t(φ˜)− θ1q(φ˜), 26 (13)
φ∗τj(θ2) ∈ argmaxφ˜∈∆(Ma×Ms)p2jv(s(φ˜) + t(φ˜)− θ2q(φ˜)− U2j)− λj∆θq(φ˜). (14)
• Finally, the slackness conditions tell us that λj = 0 (resp. µj = 0) when (1) (resp. when
(10)) is slack in (S).
When the multiplier λj of (1) is positive, φ
∗
τj
(θ2) may thus differ from the ex post
optimal collective manipulation. Instead, φ∗τj(θ1) is always ex post efficient.
4.1.2 The Collusion-Proofness Principle
There is no loss of generality in restricting the analysis to collusion-proof grand-mechanisms
such that the optimal side-contract proposed by the supervisor to the agent and accepted
26The φ∗τj (·) are measures (we allow for stochastic side-mechanisms) and the argmax above should be
viewed as saying that any manipulation in the support of φ∗τj (·) must maximize the right-hand side.
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by both types of agent entails no manipulation of reports (namely, φ∗τj(θi) = (θi, τj), for
all (i, j)) and zero side-transfers (y∗ij = 0 for all (i, j)). The principal designs now the
grand-mechanism GC so that the supervisor and the agent do not collectively manipulate
their reports to the principal. The logic of the argument is the same as that of the Reve-
lation Principle and the proof is relegated to the Appendix. Note that a collusion-proof
mechanism is such that both (10) and (11) are binding in (S) since yij = 0 and φ˜
∗
· (·) = Id.
This observation helps to characterize the collusion-proof mechanisms.
4.1.3 Coalition Incentive Constraints
Using the CARA specification makes the analysis tractable and allows us to easily rewrite
equations (13) and (14). Reports being truthful for collusion-proof grand-mechanisms,
we obtain the following characterization of the coalition incentive constraints satisfied by
those grand-mechanisms.
Proposition 1 : A grand-mechanism GC is collusion-proof if and only if, Ms = T ,
Ma = Θ× T , (1) and (2) both hold, and there exist λj for j = 1, 2 such that the following
coalition incentive constraints are also satisfied:
(θ1, τj) ∈ arg max
φ˜∈Θ×T
s(φ˜) + t(φ˜)− θ1q(φ˜), for all j = 1, 2 (15)
(θ2, τj) ∈ arg max
φ˜∈Θ×T
−
(
λjr∆θq(φ˜) + p2je
−r(s(φ˜)+t(φ˜)−θ2q(φ˜)−u2j)
)
for all j = 1, 2. (16)
with
0 ≤ λj ≤ p1je−r(s1j+t1j−θ1q1j−u1j). (17)
Let us define the coalition’s aggregate payoff as wij = sij + tij − θiqij. The coalition
incentive constraints ensuring that this coalition does not manipulate reports to the prin-
cipal can then easily be derived with these new variables. From two revealed-preference
arguments using (15) respectively when τ = τ1 and τ = τ2, we obtain immediately:
w11 = w12. (18)
The optimal collusion-proof grand-mechanism cannot screen apart two coalitions involving
an efficient agent but different supervisory signals with respect to their aggregate payoffs.
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For a given value of the supervisory information τj, (15) implies that the coalition will
not misreport θ when the agent is efficient if:
w11 ≥ w21 + ∆θq21, (19)
and
w12 ≥ w22 + ∆θq22. (20)
Moreover, (16) also prevents a supervisor having observed signal τ1 and learned that the
agent has type θ2 through side-contracting from reporting to the principal that the state
of nature is (θ2, τ2). The corresponding coalition incentive constraint becomes:
p21e
−r(w22−u21) + λ1r∆θq22 ≥ p21e−r(w21−u21) + λ1r∆θq21. (21)
From (17), λ1 is such that:
0 ≤ λ1 ≤ p11e−r(w11−u11). (22)
Finally, using again (16), we obtain also the reverse coalition incentive compatibility
constraint. A supervisor having observed signal τ2 and having learned that the agent has
type θ2 through side-contracting prefers to tell the truth rather than reporting that the
state of nature is (θ2, τ1). This constraint rewrites as:
p22e
−r(w21−u22) + λ2r∆θq21 ≥ p22e−r(w22−u22) + λ2r∆θq22. (23)
Using again (17), λ2 is such that:
0 ≤ λ2 ≤ p12e−r(w12−u12). (24)
Dividing (21) by p21 and (23) by p22 and summing yields
r∆θ
(
λ1
p21eru21
− λ2
p22eru22
)
(q22 − q21) ≥ 0. (25)
Hence, the monotonicity constraint
q22 ≥ q21 (26)
must be satisfied by an implementable collusion-proof grand-mechanism27 when r > 0
and when the following inequality between multipliers holds:
λ1
p21eru21
>
λ2
p22eru22
. (27)
27Note that this constraint is satisfied by the second-best allocation obtained without collusion.
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Feasible grand-mechanisms must also satisfy the supervisor’s interim participation con-
straints: which write respectively as:
p11 + p21 ≥ p11e−r(w11−u11) + p21e−r(w21−u21). (28)
and
p12 + p22 ≥ p12e−r(w12−u12) + p22e−r(w22−u22). (29)
4.2 The Optimal Collusion-Proof Grand-Mechanism
We now proceed as follows. First, we take the values of λ1 and λ2 as given and we
consider the whole class of collusion-proof grand-mechanisms satisfying coalition incen-
tive compatibility constraints with those values of the multipliers. Assuming that (27)
holds, one can omit the coalition incentive constraint (23) and consider only (21) and the
implementability condition (26). (26) is then checked ex post. Moreover, when (23) is
slack, the principal’s expected profit does not depend on λ2. We can thus denote this
profit as Π(λ1). Taking as given the results of the optimization within this class of λ1-
collusion-proof grand-mechanisms for a fixed λ1, we finally optimize with respect to λ1
under the constraint that (24) remains satisfied. Finally, we check that λ2 can be chosen
to satisfy (27) and (24). The first step of the optimization consists thus in finding the
optimal λ1-collusion-proof grand-mechanism under centralized contracting as a solution
to the following problem
P (λ1) : Π(λ1) = max{qij ,wij ,Uij}
∑
i,j
pij(R(qij)− θiqij − wij)
subject to (1)-(2)-(18)-(19)-(20)-(21)-(28) and (29).
The second step of the optimization is to find the optimal value of λ1. This is obtained
by solving the following problem:
max
λ1
Π(λ1)
subject to
0 ≤ λ1 ≤ p11e−r(w11(λ1)−u11(λ1)) (30)
where w11(λ1) and u11(λ1) are solutions to (P (λ1)). The next proposition summarizes the
results of this optimization.
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Proposition 2 : The optimal collusion-proof grand-mechanism GCc under centralized
contracting entails:
• Constraints (1)-(2)-(18)-(20)-(21) and (29) are all binding. All other constraints are
strictly satisfied.
• Denoting the difference of outputs by ∆qc = qc22− qc21, the agent’s information rents are
given by:
uc11 = ∆θq
c
21, (31)
uc12 = ∆θq
c
22, (32)
uc21 = u
c
22 = 0. (33)
The supervisor’s wages are given by:
sc11 = ∆θ∆q
c, (34)
sc12 = s
c
22 = 0, (35)
sc21 = −
1
r
ln
(
1 +
p11
p21
r∆θ∆qce−r∆θ∆q
c
)
. (36)
The supervisor’s expected information rents when τ1 and τ2 are observed are respectively
given by:
V c1 = p(θ1|τ1)v(sc11) + p(θ2|τ1)v(sc21) = p(θ1|τ1)
(
1− e−r∆θ∆qc(1 + r∆θ∆qc)
)
> 0, (37)
V c2 = p(θ1|τ2)v(sc12) + p(θ2|τ2)v(sc22) = 0. (38)
• The schedule of outputs is decreasing; qc11 = qc12 = qfb1 > qc22 > qc21 where qc2j for j = 1, 2
are implicitly defined by:
R′(qc21) = θ2 + ∆θ
p11e
−r∆θ∆qc
p21 + p11r∆θ∆qce−r∆θ∆q
c , (39)
R′(qc22) = θ2 +
∆θ
p22
(
p11 + p12 − p21p11e
−r∆θ∆qc
p21 + p11r∆θ∆qce−r∆θ∆q
c
)
. (40)
• In state τ1, the values of the multipliers are given by λc1 = p11e−r∆θ∆qc and µc1 = 0. In
state τ2, λ
c
2 = p12 and µ
c
2 = 0 is one possible choice for those multipliers.
To understand this proposition, let us first come back to the conditionally optimal
grand-mechanism GCsb and show how it must be modified to deter the side-contract
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SCsb. First, the wage sc11 must be at least equal to the positive bribe −ysb11 = ∆θ(qsb22−qsb21)
that the supervisor can get with a manipulation of reports. This raises the supervisor’s
expected utility in state τ1. Given that the supervisor accepts the grand-mechanism before
learning the agent’s type, the principal can recoup some of this extra cost by reducing the
supervisor’s wage sc21, i.e., the wage when he faces an inefficient agent. Of course, using
such a wage lottery for the risk averse supervisor is costly. Moreover, reducing sc21 may
now also conflict with another incentive problem, namely ensuring that the coalition does
not report (θ2, τ2) when the true state is (θ2, τ1) (as captured by (21)).
28
If the supervisor is risk neutral, it is costless to design a grand-mechanism so that the
supervisor has no incentive to collude when he observes τ1. Consider a grand-mechanism
stipulating the second-best levels of outputs and transfers to the agent as before but with
the following wages for the supervisor sc11 = ∆θ(q
sb
22 − qsb21), sc21 = −p11p21 ∆θ(qsb22 − qsb21), sc12 =
sc22 = 0. The risk neutral supervisor’s expected utility is still zero whether he observes
τ1 or τ2. Moreover, s
c
11 is high enough to induce the truthful report of state (θ1, τ1). The
only thing left to check is that the coalition does not want to report (θ2, τ2) when (θ2, τ1)
realizes. Such a manipulation increases the supervisor’s wage in this state of the world
by sc22 − sc21 = p11p21 ∆θ(qsb22 − qsb21). However, this side-contract has to be offered before the
agent has revealed his type to the supervisor and the supervisor takes thus into account
that changing what he commits to announce in state (θ2, τ1) also affects the information
rent paid to the agent in state (θ1, τ1). Offering such a side-contract has a cost for the
supervisor since the efficient agent’s rent increases from ∆θqsb21 to ∆θq
sb
22 when τ1 realizes.
The expected cost of this manipulation borne by the supervisor is then p(θ1|τ1)∆θ(qsb22−qsb21)
which just cancels out with its possible benefit. Hence, this grand-mechanism is coalition
incentive compatible and implements the second-best outcome.
It is no longer costless to deter collusion when the supervisor is risk averse. Offering
the previous wage lottery to the supervisor becomes costly since the supervisor must now
receive a risk premium to accept the grand-mechanism. The principal faces a trade-off
between providing insurance to the supervisor and inducing him to truthfully reveal his
signal. The solution to this problem requires that, in comparison with the collusion-proof
grand-mechanism offered under risk neutrality, the lottery faced by a supervisor knowing
τ1 is less risky. The collusion stake ∆θ(q22 − q21) and the difference between s22 and s21
28Notice that the principal would still like to fully insure a supervisor who has observed τ2 at the
minimum level of wages, i.e., sc12 = s
c
22 = 0.
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are both reduced.
• Collusion under Symmetric Information: The fact that the supervisor is not
fully informed on the agent’s type is key for the results above. If collusion takes place
under symmetric information, the trade-off faced by the supervisor between increasing
his payoff in state (θ2, τ1) and reducing the information rent of the efficient agent no
longer exists. The optimal collective manipulation of reports is always ex post efficient.
This does not change the coalition incentive constraints (18), (19) and (20). However,
(21) and (23) are written now with λ1 = λ2 = 0 since there is no incentive constraint
within the collusion. We derive from those latter two coalition incentive compatibility
constraints that w21 = w22. The principal can no longer screen with respect to τ . He
offers a pooling contract such that q21 = q22 = q
p
2. Moreover, w21 = w22 = 0 and
w11 = w12 = ∆θq
p
2. Soft supervisory information is useless when collusion takes place
under symmetric information.
• Unique Implementation with Passive Beliefs: Without uniqueness of the non-
cooperative play of GCc, there could be potentially other continuation equilibria where
agents collude with the threat of playing another non-cooperative equilibrium of the grand-
mechanism if they refuse to collude. In the Appendix, we show how to construct the
out-of-equilibrium wages scijk for j 6= k to ensure unique Nash implementation when
the supervisor holds passive beliefs following the agent’s refusal of playing the null side-
contract. The way these wages are constructed is similar to that when they do not collude.
Things are different when, in a continuation where collusion takes place, the agent’s
acceptance of a side-contract is sustained by the threat of playing non-cooperatively the
grand-mechanism with non-passive beliefs. Indeed, the acceptance or refusal of the collu-
sive side-contract can be viewed as a cheap talk stage which could be used to update the
supervisor’s beliefs on the agent’s type. Let us still assume that the principal offers GCc
but that, when τ1 realizes, the supervisor holds pessimistic beliefs following the agent’s
refusal of the null side-contract and assumes that the agent is efficient with probability
p(θ1|τ2). Remember that the principal has designed the out-of-equilibrium wages scijk to
ensure unique implementation when a supervisor having observed τ2 keeps passive beliefs
following the agent’s refusal of a side-contract. Hence, the unique non-cooperative equi-
librium of GCc when this mechanism is played with these pessimistic beliefs is such that
both the supervisor and the agent report τ2 to the principal. By refusing the side-contract,
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the efficient agent gets now a rent ∆θqc22 which is greater than what he gets in the contin-
uation equilibrium sustained with passive beliefs, namely ∆θqc21. With those pessimistic
beliefs, the supervisor has an expected payoff p(θ1|τ2)v(sc12) + p(θ2|τ2)v(sc22) = 0 which is
lower than his expected payoff from playing the mechanisms with passive beliefs. Given
these non-passive beliefs, the supervisor finds optimal to offer a non-truthful collusive
side-contract SCnt entailing the manipulations φntτj (θ1) = (θ1, τ2) and φ
nt
τj
(θ2) = (θ2, τj) for
j = 1, 2 and zero side-transfers. With this continuation, the supervisor gets an expected
payoff (computed with prior beliefs on the equilibrium path since both types of agent
accept the side-contract) p(θ1|τ1)v(wc12 −∆θqc22) + p(θ2|τ1)v(wc22) = 0. The efficient agent
gets instead ∆θqc22. Note that this side-contract allocates all the gains from collusion to
the agent and entails the same manipulation of reports as under complete information
within the coalition. There are nevertheless two problems with this non-truthful contin-
uation following the offer of GCc. First, it yields a lower payoff to the principal who, in
the spirit of standard mechanism design, could recommend to the agents the continua-
tion he prefers and select thereby the truthful continuation sustained with passive beliefs.
Second, given that the supervisor also prefers this latter equilibrium and is endowed with
all the bargaining power at the collusion stage, he should also recommend it.29
By contrast, as we see below, the multiplicity of continuation equilibria disappears if
the principal offers a decentralized mechanism. Then, the agent’s refusal from playing this
mechanism has no impact on his status quo payoff which is identically equal to zero.30
29One may also wonder whether sensible restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs eliminate the non-
truthful continuation. The most suited refinement for mechanism design problem was developed by
Cramton and Palfrey (1995) who defined the notions of ratifiable and strongly ratifiable mechanisms.
First, they define a credible veto belief as putting positive weights on those types who do not agree to
play a collusive mechanism when the status quo mechanism is played with the corresponding beliefs. A
side-contract is (resp. strongly) ratifiable when there does not exist a credible veto belief or if such a
(resp. all) system (s) does not change the payoff of any type. One can show that both the truthful null
side-contract sustained with passive beliefs and the non-truthful collusive side-contract defined above are
strongly ratifiable.
30An alternative alley which is generally taken by the implementation literature to eliminate unwanted
equilibria in non-cooperative environments would be to use extended messages in a centralized mechanism.
We do not investigate this route since decentralization provides already a simple and attractive solution
to this multiplicity problem. Note however that the decentralized institution requires that the principal
has the ability to commit not to communicate with the agent.
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5 The Equivalence Principle
The optimal collusion-proof grand-mechanism is clearly an upper bound on what the
principal can achieve as any other mechanism can be reproduced by a centralized one.
The point of this section is to show that the principal can also implement this outcome
by simply delegating to the supervisor the right to contract with the agent.
Starting from the transfers and outputs of the optimal collusion-proof centralized
grand-mechanism GC, let us consider the following direct grand-mechanism G˜C:
• Transfers: t˜ij = 0, s˜ij = scij + tcij for all (i, j).
• Outputs: q˜ij = qcij for all (i, j).
G˜C is thus obtained from GCc by keeping the same outputs but giving to the supervi-
sor all the transfers needed to implement those outputs. G˜C is a decentralized mechanism
since the principal deals only with the supervisor who reports both his signal and the in-
formation he has learned on the agent first and, second, chooses the agent’s transfer. The
non-cooperative play of G˜C yields thus zero payoff to both the supervisor and the agent
since the agent does not play the grand-mechanism if he refuses also the sub-contract.31
Given this grand-mechanism, the best sub-contract offered by S is obtained as a special
case of Section 4.1.1. By definition, the agent receives now no rent in the non-cooperative
play of G˜C, Uij = 0, and these null status quo payoffs cannot constrain (S). Hence,
µj = 0 for j = 1, 2, and, from (12), the multipliers λj are equal to the supervisor’s
marginal utility of income when facing an efficient agent times p1j. These are precisely
the same as under centralized contracting. Therefore, coalition incentive constraints take
the same form. Since the aggregate payoffs of the coalition in all states of nature are
unchanged, the optimal manipulation of reports remain truthful. Moreover, only the
efficient agent’s incentive constraints are binding at the sub-contracting stage and their
costs are minimized by the supervisor in the same way as the principal would have done
under centralized contracting. The agent’s information rents from playing the composition
of the optimal sub-contract and the grand-mechanism G˜C are thus respectively u˜1j =
∆θqc2j = y˜1j − θ1qc1j and u˜2j = 0 = y˜2j − θ2qc2j where y˜1j denote the transfers offered by
the supervisor to the agent in the sub-contract. It is easy to check that these transfers
31Moreover, note that sijk, tijk, and qijk are not defined for j 6= k.
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are the same as with the centralized mechanism, y˜1j = t
c
1j. This finally leads us to state
our Equivalence Principle.
Proposition 3 : The Equivalence Principle: The optimal collusion-proof centralized
grand-mechanism can be implemented with a decentralized mechanism.
Under centralization, the principal directly communicates with the agent and sets his
wages. Recall that the principal is able to deter collusion only by benefitting from asym-
metric information at the collusive stage. So the basic question behind the Equivalence
Principle is whether the principal can use the agent’s status quo payoffs to exacerbate the
frictions coming from those informational asymmetries at the collusive stage. The answer
to this question comes from the screening literature with type-dependent reservation util-
ities in a two-type model. Consider the supervisor-agent relationship. It is a standard
principal-agent problem where the upward incentive constraint of the efficient agent im-
plies the downward incentive constraint of the inefficient type. Suppose now that we raise
the reservation utility of the efficient type. If this reservation utility is sufficiently large,32
the incentive constraint is less binding at the collusion stage and the trade-off between
rent extraction and efficiency in the coalition is tilted towards efficiency. Increasing the
agent’s status quo utility in the grand-mechanism is not going to help reducing the cost
of coalition incentive constraints: the efficient agent’s incentive constraint in the collusion
is less likely to bind. So the principal would like to lower as much as he can the agent’s
utility levels in the centralized grand-mechanism. But this is exactly what is achieved by a
decentralized contracting since the supervisor is willing to put the agent at the minimum
level of rents compatible with the latter’s participation and incentive constraints. The
centralized mechanism cannot do better than the decentralized one.
The optimal decentralized grand-mechanism can thus be viewed as a particular imple-
mentation of the optimal collusion-proof grand-mechanism under centralized contracting.
This implementation ensures also uniqueness of the continuation equilibrium. In a de-
centralized organization the principal shuts down the communication channel with the
agent and kills the possibility of various continuation equilibria. In particular, even if the
agent’s refusal of the sub-contract changes the supervisor’s beliefs, it has no impact on
32But not too much in order to avoid countervailing incentives at the collusion stage. A collusion-proof
mechanism such that those constraints are binding is clearly dominated and, hence, we have restricted
the analysis to the case where the agent’s upward incentive constraint is binding.
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his payoff following this refusal since this payoff remains identically equal at zero. This
gives an argument for the strict dominance of a decentralized mechanism where collusion,
by design, takes place on the equilibrium path.33
6 Comparative Statics
With the insight of our Equivalence Principle, we can now examine the impact on the
optimal contract of the different parameters characterizing the economic environment.
We now make the dependence of output on r explicit.
6.1 The Role of Risk Aversion
Proposition 4 : qc21(r) (resp. q
c
22(r)) is an increasing (resp. decreasing) function of the
supervisor’s degree of risk aversion r. Moreover, for all r > 0, qc21(r) < q
c
22(r) and:
lim
r→∞ q
c
21(r) = limr→∞ q
c
22(r) = q
p
2,
lim
r→0 q
c
2j(r) = q
sb
2j.
We have already discussed the reason why, with a risk neutral supervisor, collusion can
be deterred at no cost. Equivalently, delegating the sub-contract to the risk neutral su-
pervisor is costless for the principal in the decentralized structure. The analogy with a
standard moral hazard problem helps to understand Proposition 4. The principal wants
to give the right incentives to the supervisor regarding the choice of a sub-contract. Ex-
tending the logic of the standard moral hazard literature, this incentive problem can be
solved at no cost with risk neutrality. There exists a system of state-dependent rewards
and punishments which induces a costless revelation of supervisory information. The
contractual outcome is conditionally optimal.
With a risk averse supervisor, the principal must provide costly insurance and outputs
are distorted to limit the risk borne by the supervisor. This risk being proportional to
33The supervisor is indifferent between claiming truthfully (θ2, τ1) or (θ2, τ2) even in the decentralized
organization. This indifference is, as usual, broken in favor of the principal and this can be done at  cost
by perturbing transfers. Hence, this non-truthful continuation is irrelevant.
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∆qc, the more risk averse the supervisor, the greater the insurance concern and the larger
the output distortions needed to fight collusion with respect to the conditionally optimal
outcome. qc22(r) and q
c
21(r) are more and more distorted away from their values obtained
with risk neutrality as r increases. In the limit, these outputs converge one towards the
other and supervisory information becomes useless for the principal and bunching along
τ becomes optimal. The optimal contract becomes somewhat “incomplete” as it is now
almost independent of τ . Except in this limiting case, the information collected by the
supervisor has always a positive value.
6.2 Precision of Supervisory Information
Taking risk aversion as given, we inspect now the effect of the accuracy of the supervisor’s
information on the optimal contract. The informational structure defined in Footnote 12
(with  = Prob(τi|θi) ≥ 1/2) is useful for examining this question.
Proposition 5 : When  converges towards 1
2
(uninformative signal) and 1 (perfectly
informative signal), the inefficient agent’s expected output converges to the unconditional
second-best qp2. The principal’s expected welfare W () is non-monotonic in  with W
(
1
2
)
=
W (1), W ′
(
1
2
)
= 0 and W ′ (1) = −∞, i.e., it has an interior maximum for sb ∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
.
The Equivalence Principle is here also useful to understand the impact of the accuracy
of supervisory information. Consider the decentralized structure, the reason why the
second-best is produced when  = 1
2
is trivial: the signal is uninformative, so de facto the
three-tier hierarchy boils down to a standard principal-agent pair without supervision.
But similarly the three-tier hierarchy reduces to a standard principal-agent pair when
the supervisory information is almost perfect. If  = 1, there is indeed no asymmetry
of information between the supervisor and the agent. Then, everything happens as if
the supervisor is endowed with the production technology himself: he can produce any
quantity q by simply paying t = θiq to the agent. In the decentralized setting, the principal
ends up facing a merger between the supervisor and the agent.
The most preferred supervisory technology from the principal’s point of view is an
interior one which trades off the direct benefit of a more precise supervisory signal against
the increase in the agency cost of decentralized contracting (or equivalently in the cost of
deterring collusion). A more accurate supervisory information makes easier the control
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of the agent. However, it also makes collusion easier. When  increases, this latter effect
dominates. A more precise information may now hurt the principal. Therefore, the
optimal information structure trades-off a better control of the agent by the supervisor
against a worse control of the supervisor by the principal himself.34
6.3 Bargaining Power and Side-Contracting
Let us now consider the case where the agent has some bargaining power at the time of
designing the collusive agreement. To model such a setting, we assume that there exists
a third party which offers the side-contract to maximize a weighted sum of the agent and
the supervisor’s utility with a weight α on the agent’s utility. τj is known to the third
party but the agent still has to be provided with the right incentive to report his type.The
optimal side-contract is now solution to the following problem:
max
{φτj (·),uij}
p(θ1|τj)
(
v(s(φτj(θ1)) + t(φτj(θ1))− θ1q(φτj(θ1))− u1j) + αu1j
)
+p(θ2|τj)
(
v(s(φτj(θ2)) + t(φτj(θ2))− θ2q(φτj(θ2))− u2j) + αu2j
)
subject to (1)-(10)-(11)
and the supervisor’s participation constraints at the side-contracting stage:
p(θ1|τj)v(s(φτj(θ1)) + t(φτj(θ1))− θ1q(φτj(θ1))− u1j) (41)
+p(θ2|τj)v(s(φτj(θ2)) + t(φτj(θ2))− θ2q(φdτj(θ2))− u2j) ≥ Vj
where Vj denotes the supervisor’s status quo payoff from playing non-cooperatively the
grand-mechanism.
The solution to this problem can be derived as before. Denoting now the respective
positive multipliers of (1), (2), (41) by λj(α), µj(α) and νj(α), we find the following
characterization of the optimum:
• Optimizing with respect to u1j yields:
p1j
(
(1 + νj(α))v
′(s(φ∗τj(θ1)) + t(φ
∗
τj
(θ1))− θ1q(φ∗τj(θ1))− u∗1j)− α
)
= λj(α) + µj(α).
(42)
34This result on the optimality of an intermediate accuracy for supervisory information belongs to an
emerging literature endogenizing information structures in principal-agent models. See Cre´mer (1995),
Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), Schmidt (1996) and Faure-Grimaud (2002). A similar result is obtained
in Laffont and Meleu (1997) for the case of hard information and exogenous transaction costs of collusion.
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• Optimizing with respect to φ∗τj(θ1) and φ∗τj(θ2), we obtain respectively:
φ∗τj(θ1) ∈ arg max
φ˜∈∆(Ma×Ms)
s(φ˜) + t(φ˜)− θ1q(φ˜), (43)
φ∗τj(θ2) ∈ arg max
φ˜∈∆(Ma×Ms)
p2j(1 + νj(α))v(s(φ˜) + t(φ˜)− θ2q(φ˜)−u∗2j)−λj(α)∆θq(φ˜). (44)
• Finally, the slackness conditions tell us that λj(α) = 0 (resp. µj(α) = 0 and νj(α) = 0)
when (1) (resp. when (10) and when (41)) is slack.
The characterization of the collusion-proof mechanisms still obey (12) and (14). Those
constraints remain in fact the same as before except for the fact that λ˜j(α) =
λj(α)
1+νj(α)
and
µ˜j(α) =
µj(α)+αp1j
1+νj(α)
are now replacing respectively λj and µj.
For fixed values of the multipliers λj(α) and µj(α), we can, as in Section 4, define
various classes of collusion-proof grand-mechanisms. The principal can also play on the
values of these multipliers to improve contracting. By setting νj(α) very large but keeping
λj(α)
1+νj(α)
constant and equal to λj, the principal can come as close as he wants to the
outcome obtained with the supervisor having all the bargaining power in the collusion.
The principal can thus replicate the same outcome as if the agent has no bargaining
power.
To get further insight on this issue, let us consider now the polar case where the agent
has all the bargaining power in designing the collusive agreement under centralized con-
tracting. To keep some symmetry with the previous analysis, we assume that the collusive
offer is made by the agent before he learns θ but after τ is learned by both the agent and
the supervisor. We already know that the optimal collusion-proof mechanism GCc found
in Section 4 may not be robust to this kind of collusion if the principal cannot recommend
which out-of-equilibrium beliefs are held by the supervisor following the agent’s refusal
from colluding. Indeed, the side-contract SCnt sustained with pessimistic beliefs gives
all the bargaining power to the agent and clearly maximizes his expected payoff. The
principal can nevertheless avoid this outcome by recommending to the supervisor that
he holds passive beliefs following the agent’s refusal of a side-contract which amounts to
ensuring that the supervisor gets V c1 in the non-cooperative truthful play of GC
c when
he has observed τ1. Even if the agent has all the bargaining power, no other side-contract
than the null one can improve his own payoff and be accepted by the supervisor since V c1
maximizes the latter’s payoff when he has all the bargaining power.
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7 Conclusion
Our first main result is that soft supervisory information helps the principal even though
the supervisor and the supervised agent collude if this collusion takes place under asym-
metric information. A second insight of this paper is that the optimal collusion-proof
contract can be implemented by delegating to the less informed agent in the organization,
namely the supervisor, the task to contract with the more informed productive agent.
Beyond these results, it is worth stressing some conditions under which either organi-
zational form strictly dominates. As already noticed in the text, decentralization may be
strictly preferred if one insists on unique implementation. The idea, new to our knowl-
edge, that decentralization is a way to get rid of multiple equilibria when fighting collusion
could extend to other settings of interest. Other elements could be considered to pursue
the comparison between the two structures. First, limiting the enforceability of collusive
contracts increases the principal’s profit in the centralized organization and favors this
organizational form. The principal is then better off integrating the productive activities
rather than decentralizing when frictions on the enforceability of the side-contract exist.
In particular, the supervisor may not be always corruptible. If the probability of honesty
is large enough in a centralized organization and information on the honesty type cannot
be extracted by the principal, the principal allows for some (almost costless) equilibrium
collusion between a dishonest supervisor and the agent. In this case, a decentralized or-
ganization is dominated. Reciprocally, if informational problems within the coalition are
less acute under centralized contracting, collusion may then be more costly than decen-
tralized contracting. Finally, one reading of our result is that delegating contracting to
the less informed agent within the coalition helps the principal. It would be interesting
to investigate how this result extends or changes when the agent is also asymmetrically
informed on the supervisor’s signal.
Under decentralized contracting, we have assumed so far that the supervisor keeps all
bargaining power at the sub-contracting stage. A more even distribution of this bargaining
would make decentralization costly for the principal since he can no longer restore his most
preferred allocation by shifting up the status quo payoff of the supervisor. This would
invalidate the Equivalence Principle and restore the benefits of centralized contracting.
More generally, this last point clearly raises the issue of the exact relationship between
the allocation of formal authority in the hierarchy and the kind of social relationships
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which establish among its different layers. This remains a fascinating issue which should
deserve more work.
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Appendix
Proof of the Collusion-Proofness-Principle: We denote by SC∗ the pair of optimal
side-contracts SC∗τj proposed by the supervisor to the agent according to his supervisory
signal τj. These side-contracts are accepted by both types along an equilibrium path
where non-trivial side-contracts are enforced. These side-contracts SC∗τj are incentive
compatible for both types (in particular, they satisfy (1)), stipulate a manipulation of
reports φ∗· (·) and side-transfers y∗ij according to the supervisor’s signal such that (10)
and (11) are satisfied for both signals τ1 and τ2. Let us denote by u
∗
ij the information
rents of a θi agent when accepting the optimal side-contracts SC
∗
τj
, reporting truthfully
to the supervisor and obeying the latter’s recommendations of reports to the principal.
The reservation utility of the agent is then Uij, i.e., his payoff in one non-cooperative
equilibrium of the grand-mechanism. Then, starting from any grand-mechanism GC
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(possibly an indirect one) let us construct a new grand-mechanism G˜C = GC ◦ SC∗
with message spaces M˜s = T and M˜a = Θ × T . This direct grand-mechanism is such
that, once it is offered by the principal, the optimal side-contracts S˜C
∗
which are offered
by the supervisor at the side-contracting stage are the null-side-contracts entailing no
further manipulation of reports, φ˜∗· (·) = Id and no side-transfers, y˜∗ij = 0 ∀(i, j), i.e.,
the grand-mechanism is also truthful. Suppose it is not the case, then, there would exist
a non-null pair of side-contracts S˜C
∗
τj
for j = 1, 2 which would satisfy (1) and would leave
both types with enough information rent so that they prefer these new side-contracts
S˜C
∗
τj
, i.e, u˜∗ij ≥ u∗ij ≥ Uij. The agent’s acceptance of playing the new side-contract
S˜C
∗
τj
is sustained by the threat of playing side-contract SC∗τj with passive beliefs so that
the corresponding play of the game gives him u∗ij. Moreover, at least one of these side-
contracts S˜C
∗
τj
for j = 1, 2 would yield a strictly higher profit to the supervisor than the
null side-contract. Then, the supervisor would have been strictly better off offering the
side-contract SCc
∗ ◦ S˜C∗ in the first place when GC was offered by the principal. Hence,
a contradiction with the definition of SC∗.
Proof of Proposition 1: First, since (13) holds for all φ˜(·) ∈ ∆(Ms × Ma) it holds
also in particular for φ∗τj′ (θi′) for all j
′ 6= j and i′ 6= i. GC ◦ SC∗ is thus a collusion-
proof grand-mechanism satisfying (15). One obtains similarly (16) from (14). Second,
µcj ≥ 0 and (12) imply that λcj satisfies (17). In a collusion-proof grand-mechanism, it
must be that u∗1j = U1j and this equality has been used to express the right-hand side in
(17). Lastly, (1) being satisfied by the information rents obtained by the agent from side-
contracting and those rents being those committed to by the principal offering a collusion-
proof grand-mechanism, (1) must also be part of the description of these collusion-proof
grand-mechanisms.
Proof of Propositions 2 and 4:
• It is useful to make the following change of variables zij = e−rwij . For a fixed schedule
of outputs qij, the principal’s objective function becomes then strictly concave in zij (for
r > 0) and constraints (18)-(19)-(20)-(21)-(23)-(28)-(29) form now a system of linear
constraints in zij. We will first assume that the only relevant constraints are (18)-(20)-
(21)-(29). We will check ex post that the other constraints are satisfied at the optimum
as well as the monotonicity conditions q1j ≥ q2j for j = 1, 2 and q22 ≥ q21. Rewriting
constraints (18)-(19)-(20) and (21) with our new variables yields respectively:
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(18) becomes
z11 = z12, (45)
(19) becomes
z11 ≤ z21e−r∆θq21 , (46)
(20) when becomes
z12 ≤ z22e−r∆θq22 , (47)
(21) becomes
p21(z22 − z21) ≥ −λ1r∆θ(q22 − q21)e−ru21 . (48)
With the new variables, (28) and (29) rewrite respectively as:
p11 + p21 ≥ p11eru11z11 + p12eru21z21, (49)
p12 + p22 ≥ p12eru12z12 + p22eru22z22. (50)
Moreover, the efficient agent’s incentive compatibility constraint rewrite respectively as:
u11 ≥ u21 + ∆θq21, (51)
u12 ≥ u22 + ∆θq22. (52)
Making the agent’s incentive constraints (51) and (52) both binding relaxes the supervi-
sor’s participation constraints (49) and (50). Hence, (49) and (50) rewrite respectively
as:
(p11z11e
r∆θq21 + p21z21)e
ru21 ≤ p11 + p21. (53)
(p12z11e
r∆θq22 + p22z22)e
ru22 ≤ p12 + p22. (54)
• For a given schedule of outputs qij, the principal wants first to minimize the cost of
implementing this schedule:
max
{zij ,u2j}
∑
i,j
pij
r
ln(zij)
subject to (2)-(45)-(46)-(47)-(48)-(53) and (54).
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First, we fix all the zij and optimize with respect to the remaining variables, i.e., (once
one has noticed that (1) is binding for all j) u2j only.
Since λ1 ≥ 0 and q22 ≥ q21, (48) is relaxed when e−ru21 is as large as possible. Similarly,
(53) is also relaxed when e−ru21 is as large as possible as long as (2) for j = 1 remains
satisfied. The constrained set is finally larger when u21 = 0. Similarly, (54) is relaxed
when u22 is as small as possible as long as (2) for j = 2 remains satisfied. The principal’s
objective function is thus also maximized when u22 = 0.
Inserting these values of u21 and u22 into the constrained of the principal’s problem,
these constraints become linear in zij and we can continue the optimization.
• The maximization of the principal’s problem yields that (45), (47), (48) and (54) are all
binding. We check ex post that other constraints are slack when those four constraints
are binding. We get immediately:
zc22 = 1, (55)
zc12 = z
c
11 = e
−r∆θq22 (56)
zc21 = 1 +
λ1r
p21
∆θ(q22 − q21). (57)
We thus obtain wc11 = w
c
12 = ∆θq22, w
c
22 = 0 and w
c
21 = −1r ln
(
1 + λ1r
p21
∆θ(q22 − q21)
)
< 0.
• Inserting the corresponding values of zcij as functions of outputs into the principal’s
objective function and optimizing with respect to qij yields no distortion for the θ1 type
with respect to the first-best and distortions for the θ2 type which are given by:
R′(qc21(λ1)) = θ2 + ∆θ
λ1
p21 + λ1r∆θ(qc22(λ1)− qc21(λ1))
, (58)
R′(qc22(λ1)) = θ2 +
∆θ
p22
(
p11 + p12 − p21λ1
p21 + λ1r∆θ(qc22(λ1)− qc21(λ1))
)
(59)
where we make explicit the dependence of those outputs on λ1. We observe that the
implementatibility condition q22(λ1) ≥ q21(λ1) is satisfied by the solutions to (58) and
(59) for λ1 ≥ λm = p21(p11+p21)p21+p22 . For λ1 = λm, the two outputs are equal and when
λ1 < λm, the solutions to (58) and (59) do not satisfy the monotonicity condition. Hence,
there is some bunching yielding q22(λ1) = q21(λ1) = q
p
2. Note that the principal’s profit
does not depend on λ1 for λ1 ≤ λm.
• Let us now optimize Π(λ1) with respect to λ1. The constraint on λ1 rewrites as:
0 ≤ λ1 ≤ p11e−r∆θ∆qc(λ1). (60)
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First note that Π(λ1) is an increasing function of λ1 since a direct use of the enve-
lope theorem yields Π′(λ1) =
∆θ∆qc(λ1)
p21+λ1∆θ∆qc(λ1)
≥ 0 with a strict inequality for λ1 > λm.
Hence, increasing λ1 improves the principal’s payoff. Moreover, the function φ(λ1) =
p11e
−r∆θ∆qc(λ1) − λ1 is positive for λ1 = λm since p11p21 > p11+p21p21+p22 holds when τ is positively
correlated with θ. Moreover, φ(λ1) is negative for λ1 large enough. Hence, there exists a
maximal solution to the equation φ(λ1) = 0 and it maximizes Π(λ1). (60) is thus binding
at the optimum. Inserting the corresponding value of λ1 obtained from (60) binding into
(58) and (59) yields output distortions given by (39) and (40) for the θ2 type. We also
obtain immediately the aggregate payoff’s of the coalition as:
wc11 = w
c
12 = ∆θq
c
22, (61)
wc22 = 0, (62)
wc21 = −
1
r
ln
(
1 +
p11
p21
r∆θ∆qce−r∆θ∆q
c
)
. (63)
• We prove now that qc22(r) > qc21(r) for all r and that both outputs converge to qp2 as r
goes to∞. Consider the solutions to equations (39) and (40). For r = 0, qc22(0) = qsb22 and
qc21(0) = q
sb
21. Moreover, differentiating (39) and (40) w.r.t. r yields respectively:
R′′(qc21(r))
dqc21
dr
= −p11r∆θ
2(p21e
−r∆θ∆qc(r) + p11e−2r∆θ∆q
c(r))
(p21 + p11r∆θ∆qc(r)e−r∆θ∆q
c(r))
2
(
1 + r
(
dqc22
dr
− dq
c
21
dr
))
,
(64)
and
R′′(qc22(r))
dqc22
dr
= −p21
p22
R′′(qc21(r))
dqc21
dr
. (65)
Hence
dqc21
dr
and
dqc22
dr
have opposite signs and are never equal to zero. Moreover, if
dqc21
dr
<
0 <
dqc22
dr
we would have a contradiction with (64). Hence,
dqc22
dr
< 0 and
dqc21
dr
> 0.
Suppose that there exists r1 such that ∞ > r1 > 0 and such that qc22(r1) = qc21(r1).
Inserting into (39) and (40), we obtain qc22(r1) = q
sb
22 and q
c
21(r1) = q
sb
21 < q
sb
22. A contradic-
tion. Hence, qc22(r) > q
c
21(r) for all r and there is never any bunching along τ .
• Since qc21(r) < qc22(r) < qsb22 < qc11(r) = qc12(r) = qfb1 , other monotonicity conditions on
outputs are satisfied.
• As qc22(r) ≥ qc21(r), qc22(r) is bounded below by qsb21 and qc21(r) is bounded above by
qsb22. As q
c
22(r) (resp. q
c
21(r)) is decreasing (resp. increasing) it converges towards a limit
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qc22(∞) (resp. qc21(∞)) as r goes to infinity. Moreover, qc22(∞) ≥ qc21(∞). Suppose that
qc22(∞) > qc21(∞). Then, taking the limit in (39) and (40) we obtain
R′(qc21(∞)) = θ2 < R′(qc22(∞)) = θ2 +
(
p11 + p12
p22
)
∆θ.
A contradiction since R′′(·) ≤ 0. Hence, necessarily qc21(∞) = qc22(∞) = q2(∞). But,
using (39) and (39), we obtain:
p21(R
′(qc21(r))− θ2) + p22(R′(qc22(r))− θ2) = ∆θ(p11 + p12).
Making r =∞ yields q2(∞) = qp2.
• We check all other neglected incentive and participation constraints.
• Note that the monotonicity constraints qc1j > qc2j are satisfied and they imply that
the θ2’s incentive constraint is strictly satisfied for all j.
• (1) is binding for all j and thus, since u2j = 0, u1j > 0 and the θ1’s agent’s partici-
pation constraints are satisfied for all j.
• Inserting the value of z11 obtained in (56), the supervisor’s participation constraint
(53) is strictly satisfied when:
p11(1− e−r∆θ∆qc(r)) > λc1r∆θ∆qc(r). (66)
Using that λc1 = p11e
−r∆θ∆qc(r), this amounts to checking that eX > 1 + X for
X = r∆θ∆qc(r) > 0 which obviously holds.
• (46) is strictly satisfied when
e−r∆θ∆q
c(r) < 1 + λc1r∆θ∆q
c(r) (67)
which holds since λc1 > 0 and ∆q
c(r) > 0.
• The coalition incentive constraint (23) and the condition λc1
p21
− λc2
p22
> 0 hold if we
take λc2 = p12e
−r(wc22−∆θqc22(r)) = p12, i.e., a multiplier in state τ2 equal to the marginal
utility of income of the supervisor when he faces an efficient agent times p12. This
amounts to taking also µc2 = 0 in state τ2. Moreover, note that all values λ˜
c
2 ∈ [0, p12]
could alternatively be used. The reason is that telling the truth is a strict optimum
for the coalition when (θ2, τ2) so that the coalition incentive constraint (23) is not
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binding and the value of λc2 is not pinned down by the optimization of the principal’s
problem.
Taking into account that λc1 = p11e
−r(wc21−∆θqc21(r)), we have:
λc1
p21
− λ
c
2
p22
=
p11
p21
e−r∆θ∆q
c(r) − p12
p22
. (68)
Comparing the right-hand sides of (39) and (40) and using the fact that X =
r∆θ∆qc(r) > 0, we get:
p11e
−X
p21 + p11Xe−X
>
1
p22
(
p11 + p12 − p21p11e
−X
p21 + p11Xe−X
)
which amounts to
p11
p21
(
p21e
−X
p21 + p11Xe−X
(
1 +
p21
p22
)
− p21
p22
)
>
p12
p22
.
Therefore, a sufficient condition to ensure that the right-hand side of (68) will be
strictly positive is
e−X >
p21e
−X
p21 + p11Xe−X
(
1 +
p21
p22
)
− p21
p22
or
p21
p22
eX + 1 >
p21
p21 + p11Xe−X
(
1 +
p21
p22
)
which is true since, using eX > 1 (for r > 0) the left-hand side above can thus be
bounded below by p21
p22
+1 which is greater than the right-hand side since p21
p21+p11Xe−X
<
1 (for r > 0).
• A coalition (θ2, τ2) must not be willing to claim that it is (θ1, τ2). This requires:
0 = p12v(w
c
12−∆θqc22(r))+p22v(wc22) > p12v(wc12−∆θqc12(r))+p22v(wc12−∆θqc12(r)).
This holds since wc12 −∆θqc12(r) = wc11 −∆θqc12(r) = ∆θ(qc22(r)− qfb1 )) < 0.
• A coalition (θ2, τ1) must not be willing to claim that it is (θ1, τ1). This requires:
p11v(w
c
11 −∆θqc21(r)) + p21v(wc21) > p11v(wc11 −∆θqc11(r)) + p21v(wc11 −∆θqc11(r)).
The left-hand side is strictly positive and the right-hand side is negative since again
wc11 −∆θqc11(r) = ∆θ(qc22(r)− qfb1 ) < 0.
38
• A coalition (θ2, τ2) must not be willing to claim that it is (θ1, τ1). This requires:
0 = p12v(w
c
12−∆θqc22(r))+p22v(wc22) > p12v(wc12−∆θqc11(r))+p22v(wc11−∆θqc11(r)).
This holds since wc12 −∆θqc11(r) = wc11 −∆θqc11(r) = ∆θ(qc22(r)− qc11(r)) < 0.
• A coalition (θ2, τ1) must not be willing to claim that it is (θ1, τ2). This requires:
p11v(w
c
11 −∆θqc21(r)) + p21v(wc21) > p11v(wc11 −∆θqc11(r)) + p21v(wc12 −∆θqc12(r)).
The left-hand side is strictly positive and the right-hand side is negative since again
wc12 −∆θqc12(r) = wc11 −∆θqc11(r) = ∆θ(qc22(r)− qfb1 ) < 0.
• Unique Implementation: Let us now describe how the principal can design out
of equilibrium punishments to ensure unique Nash implementation if the agents fail to
collude. Consider wages sci1k such that:
p(θ1|τ1)v(sc112) + p(θ2|τ1)v(sc212) > V c1 (69)
V c2 = 0 > p(θ1|τ2)v(sc112) + p(θ2|τ2)v(sc212). (70)
(69) makes impossible to sustain a non-truthful equilibrium when τ1 realizes. (70) ensures
that the supervisor does not want to lie when τ2 realizes and the agent reports truthfully
to the principal. Again, the monotone likelihood ratio property p11
p21
> p12
p22
ensures that
such punishments exist. Similarly, wages sci2k such that:
p(θ1|τ1)v(sc121) + p(θ2|τ1)v(sc221) < V c1 (71)
V c2 = 0 < p(θ1|τ2)v(sc121) + p(θ2|τ2)v(sc221). (72)
(71) ensures that the supervisor tells the truth when τ1 realizes and the agent reports
truthfully. (72) ensures that a non-truthful equilibrium does not exist when τ2 realizes.
Moreover, we impose tijk = −qijk = −∞ for j 6= k for the agent’s punishments so that
there cannot be any non-truthful equilibrium where the agent deviates both on his reports
of type and signal.
Proof of Proposition 5:
• Inserting the expressions for the pij obtained with the information structure character-
ized by Prob(τi|θi) =  gives the following expression of outputs (where we now make
explicit the dependence of outputs on ):
R′(qc21()) = θ2 + ∆θ
νe−r∆θ∆q
c()
(1− ν)(1− ) + νr∆θ∆qc()e−r∆θ∆qc() (73)
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R′(qc22()) = θ2 +
∆θ
(1− ν)
(
ν − ν(1− ν)(1− )e
−r∆θ∆qc()
(1− ν)(1− ) + νr∆θ∆qc()e−r∆θqc()
)
. (74)
When  = 1
2
, these equations reduce to:
R′
(
qc21
(
1
2
))
= θ2 + ∆θ
νe−r∆θ∆q
c( 1
2
)
1− ν + νr∆θ∆qc(1
2
)e−r∆θ∆qc(
1
2
)
R′
(
qc22
(
1
2
))
= θ2 +
2∆θ
1− ν
ν − ν(1− ν)e−r∆θ∆qc( 12 )
2
(
1− ν + νr∆θ∆qc(1
2
)e−r∆θ∆qc(
1
2
)
)
 ,
and thus:
R′
(
qc21
(
1
2
))
−R′
(
qc22
(
1
2
))
= 2∆θ
 νe−r∆θ∆qc( 12 )
1− ν + νr∆θ∆qc(1
2
)e−r∆θ∆qc(
1
2
)
− ν
1− ν
 . (75)
Assume first that qc21(
1
2
) < qc22(
1
2
), i.e., ∆qc(1
2
) > 0. Since ν
(1−ν)eX+νX is monotonically
decreasing in X, the right-hand side of (75) is thus negative and R′(qc21(
1
2
))−R′(qc22(12)) <
0. Then, from R′′(·) < 0 qc21(12) > qc22(12), a contradiction. Starting from qc21
(
1
2
)
> qc22(
1
2
),
we would get similarly qc21(
1
2
) > qc22(
1
2
), another contradiction. Thus, we necessarily have
qc21(
1
2
) = qc22(
1
2
) = qp2 such that R
′(qp2) = θ2 +
ν
1−ν∆θ.
As ∆qc() is bounded above by (qsb22 − qsb21), we can pass to the limit in (74) when 
is close to one. We immediately obtain that qc22() converges to q
p
2. q
c
21() converges to a
fixed value qc21(1) but the agent is almost never asked to produce this quantity.
• Let us now write the principal’s expected payoff as:
W () =
∑
i,j
pij(R(qij()− θiqij()− wcij(, qc()))
where pij are functions of  as in Footnote 12. Note that, only
wc21(, q
c()) = −1
r
ln
(
1 +
ν
(1− ν)(1− )r∆θ∆q
c()e−r∆θ∆q
c()
)
is both directly a function of  and indirectly through the value of ∆qc(). Others
wcij(, q
c()) only depend on  indirectly through the vector of outputs qc().
From the fact that p21()w
c
21(, q
c()) goes to zero as  goes to 1, the fact that qc22()
converges to qp2 and q
c
21() converges to a fixed value q21(1) which is almost never asked
to be produced as  goes to 1, we have immediately that W
(
1
2
)
= W (1).
Using the Envelope Theorem to differentiate W (·) with respect to , and the observa-
tion that qc11() = q
c
12() and w
c
11 = w
c
12 we find that:
W ′() = (1−ν)
(
R(qc22())− θ¯qc22()− (R(qc21())− θ¯qc21()− wc21(, qc()))− (1− )
∂wc21
∂
(, qc())
)
.
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Using the expression of wc21 given above, we thus obtain that:
W ′() = (1− ν)
(
R(qc22())− θ¯qc22())− (R(qc21())− θ¯qc21())
)
−1− ν
r
ln
(
1 +
ν
(1− ν)(1− )r∆θ∆q
c()e−r∆θ∆q
c()
)
+
1
r
νr∆θ∆qc()
(1− )er∆θ∆qc() + ν1− νr∆θ∆qc() .
Since ∆qc (1) 6= 0 is bounded, we have W ′(1) = −∞. Moreover, W ′
(
1
2
)
= 0. The non-
monotonicity of the expected welfare immediately follows from the previous observations.
Hence, there exists an optimal information structure which is interior.
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